The ISCIP Analyst, Volume VIII, Issue 8 by Comstock, Michael et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy The ISCIP Analyst
2003-05-07
The ISCIP Analyst, Volume VIII,
Issue 8
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/12019
Boston University
 1 
THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 8, Number 8 (May 7, 2003) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock and Scott Dullea 
 
Putin’s defense sector appointees 
President Vladimir Putin’s recent appointment of Major-General Alexander 
Bururtin as defense sector advisor conceivably may be an exception to primarily 
politically motivated moves. Bururtin, known for his professionalism, is a veteran 
of the General Staff Directorate of Operations in the Russian Army. He does not 
appear to enjoy direct connection with Putin’s St. Petersburg group of 
bureaucrats. The retired general will advise Putin on matters relating to defense 
industry and military-technical programs. (KOMMERSANT, 21 Apr 03; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
In another, closely related, appointment, Boris Aleshin has been elevated to the 
office of deputy prime minister in charge of military-industrial and technical 
matters. These appointments seem to signal an attempt to quell the squabbles 
that have plagued the defense sector in recent years. Nevertheless, one should 
not assume that the Kremlin is changing its approach as to how, and from whom, 
advice is taken. As one Russian newspaper reported, "In making his latest 
decisions, Vladimir Putin was guided by information received from the special 
services and the presidential administration." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 28 Apr 
03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Thus, the president continues to rely on 
his FSB connection and the "apparat." 
 
Gref, Kudrin and Kasyanov 
Currently German Gref is recovering from illness in Germany. Speculation 
abounds as to whether the beleaguered economic development and trade 
minister is likely to return, following the scathing reprimand he received recently 
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from his nominal boss, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov. According to some 
reports, Gref suffered a nervous breakdown following the meeting some weeks 
ago, offered his resignation (which was refused) and has yet to recover. Finance 
Minister Aleksei Kudrin, Gref’s ally, has denied that Gref will resign. (THE 
MOSCOW TIMES, 23 Apr 03; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Guidance from above 
In its 10-year history, the annual presidential address to the parliament has never 
been postponed as late as this year. It is now scheduled tentatively for 14 May. 
(NEZAVISMAYA GAZETA, 22 Apr 03; via Johnson’s Russia List) Although the 
date of the address is not mandated by the constitution, the unstructured method 
of its planning this year is cause for much speculation in Russian political and 
media circles. The official line is that the speech simply is not ready yet, and that 
the date of the address is not as important as its content. Critics claim that 
President Putin may be exploiting the late scheduling for any of several reasons: 
At this time many journalists and analysts are on vacation, it may follow 
President Bush’s visit to St. Petersburg, and/or the Kremlin has needed to rewrite 
the foreign policy content as a result of fallout from the Iraq war. (MOSCOW 
TIMES, 29 Apr 03; via Johnson’s Russia List) Then there are the accusations 
that the timing of the address is meant to convey an image of stability as his 
reforms have lost steam or that he is tired of addressing major issues or unwilling 
to push through any unpopular measures near election time. (IZVESTIA, 24 Apr 
03; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Indeed, Putin is keeping an eye on the approaching parliamentary elections. He 
warned the Federation Council to be wary of Duma activity in the coming months, 
asserting that election campaigns generally hinder the legislative process and 
sometimes lead to the passage of populist laws that are financially infeasible. He 
asked the Federation Council to veto any such legislation. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 
28 Apr 03) The upper house’s speaker, Sergey Mironov, assured the president 
that the senators were aware of their responsibility to pay attention to laws 
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submitted by the lower house. (ITAR-TASS, 25 Apr 03; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Of course, the president first emasculated the 
Federation Council before deciding to use it against the Duma. 
 
Recently Putin also reinforced the role of the presidential envoys as overseers of 
regional affairs. On 22 April, the president issued instructions to the seven 
plenipotentiary "supergovernors." In effect, he is expanding their powers, 
empowering them to ensure that regional laws conform to federal legislation; 
raising personnel policy to the regional level; devoting significant attention to bills 
on land reform; providing all means of federal assistance to the regional judicial 
systems and judges to aid them in establishing and maintaining their 
independence from the regional executives and legislatures; (RUSSIA TV, 23 
Apr 03; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) and concentrating 
on the transition of regional legislative assemblies to a different elections system. 
(ITAR-TASS, 23 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0423, via World News Connection) The 
president also gave his envoys operational oversight of the use of subsidies 
within the regions. These were unwritten instructions so as not to distort the 
"power vertical." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 24 Apr 03; What the Papers Say, 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The Kremlin’s intent to direct all levels of governance also is evident in a recent 
draft law on local self-government. A commission headed by Putin appointee 
Dmitri Kozak produced the new draft, which is being criticized for its centralizing 
impact. The proposal sets new criteria for territorial and administrative 
boundaries, takes power away from mayors and empowers city managers 
(whose appointment would stem from regional assemblies), relieves local 
governments of the burden of unfunded federal mandates as well as the 
responsibility for education and healthcare (stripping them of some authority in 
these fields), and shifts control over the flow of revenues. The Putin-appointed 
committee sought little input from the municipalities themselves in drafting the 
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law. (Jamestown Foundation, RUSSIA & EURASIA REVIEW, 29 Apr 03; via 
Johnson’s Russia List) 
 
Despite the unofficial nature of Putin’s verbal decrees, and the need for 
parliamentary approval of the draft law, these developments illustrate the 
Kremlin’s continuing efforts to centralize authority in Russia. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Scott Fleeher 
 
Murders and theories come in sets of three 
As the investigation into the recent murder of Duma Deputy Sergei Yushenkov 
continued to dominate Russian headlines, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev 
outlined three theories as to who might be implicated in the assassination. (The 
criteria for listing suspects are political, business and personal.) Patrushev also 
negated the notion of establishing a special commission to look into the murder. 
(ITAR-TASS, 23 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0423, via World News Connection) 
 
The formation of a special commission has been proposed by Alexander Gurov, 
chairman of the Duma Security Committee. Patrushev dismissed the need for 
any such commission, touting the world-renowned efficiency of Russian 
bureaucracy. The FSB director said that the investigation should be conducted 
by those legally authorized to do so, adding that "any other interference in these 
actions leads to inefficiency and haste in investigating crimes." 
 
Analyst Dr. Amy Knight implied that Patrushev is motivated by different concerns: 
"Don't even think about it…that [the] murder of Sergei Yushenkov was politically 
inspired. Because when you start considering motives, it leads you straight to 
President Vladimir Putin's security police," she said. (TORONTO GLOBE & 
MAIL, 23 Apr 03; via RFE/RL Security and Foreign Policy) 
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Focusing on the rash of deaths by unnatural causes among liberal lawmakers, 
Knight referred to the unsolved murder case of Duma deputy (and FSB critic) 
Galina Starovoitova. At the time of Starovoitova's November 1998 murder, 
Vladimir Putin sat at the head of the FSB. Although he had vowed to find 
Starovoitova's murderers, the case has yet to be solved. (RFE/RL Security and 
Foreign Policy, 30 Apr 03) 
 
The day after Yushenkov's murder, commentator Andrei Cherkizov offered 
another postulate of groups who might "need" Yushenkov dead. In his list of 
suspect groups, Cherkizov included defense ministry officials who profit from 
continuation of the war in Chechnya, persons who wish to expedite the 
extradition of Boris Berezovsky from Great Britain, and FSB officers angered by 
Yushenkov's efforts to prove allegations that the FSB was involved in the 1999 
Moscow apartment bombings that killed 300 (EKHO MOSKVY, 25 Apr 03; via 
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly) to provide political cover for Putin to resume 
the war in Chechnya. 
 
Anything other than the status quo is unlikely to emerge during the course of the 
Yushenkov investigation. Conversely, any doubt concerning the possible 
implications for lawmakers speaking out against those who caused the renewed 
war in Chechnya, or against the questionable practices of the FSB, may indeed 
have departed with the soul of Mr. Yushenkov. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Ansel Stein 
 
With friends like these, the Iraqis need no enemies 
In recent weeks, the Kremlin has continued to talk out of both sides of its mouth 
regarding Iraq. "We should first of all think about the Iraqi people and about 
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security in the Middle East. The international community should combine its 
efforts to help the Iraqi people to restore peaceful life, " Foreign Minister Ivan 
Ivanov said on 28 April. (INTERFAX, 1221 GMT, 30 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0430, via World News Connection) Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister and 
Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin announced that Iraq has enough oil reserves 
and sufficient infrastructure to be "quite solvent" to pay its debts to Russia. He 
said on 19 April that "any new government [in Iraq] must become a legal 
successor to Iraq's debt to Russia." (ITAR-TASS, 1619 GMT, 19 Apr 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0419, via World News Connection) Saddling a rebuilding nation with 
collection notices to the tune of $8 billion is, apparently, the Russian way of 
helping Iraqis to restore peaceful life. The Iraqi people are fortunate that Hussein 
did not sign the $40 billion development deal with Russia discussed last summer 
to ensure Moscow’s diplomatic support. 
 
Once again on the right side of a Middle Eastern tyrant 
Having used obstructionism as its primary diplomatic tool to help Iraq, Moscow 
has decided to wield it again, this time for Syria’s sake. Deputy Foreign Minister 
Alexander Saltanov swung through the Middle East last month, stopping in 
Damascus and Cairo for talks that centered on the situation in Iraq and the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The trip was timed to precede (and preempt) Colin 
Powell’s visit to the region. On 28 April, Saltanov met with Syrian Foreign 
Minister Faruq al-Shar'a in Damascus. Both sides reportedly agreed to 
coordinate actions aimed at "continuing international efforts aimed at halting the 
foreign occupation of Iraq and preserving Iraq's national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity." (ITAR-TASS, 1403 GMT, 28 Apr 03, FBIS-SOV-2003-0428, 
via World News Connection) Such an "us versus them" approach, pitting Russia 
and Syria against the US coalition, will no doubt reinforce Russo-Syrian relations. 
Given the tougher line the United States has taken toward Syria in recent weeks, 
Damascus could use a friend like Moscow. 
 
Hot prospects for Russian influence? Maybe not 
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Success in aligning with Syria, however, belies a general waning of Russian 
influence in the Middle East, and to a certain extent throughout the Muslim world, 
resulting from the eclipse of the Hussein regime. Almost as soon as hostilities 
commenced in Iraq, the Russian arms industry was touting potential military 
deals resulting from the performance of Russian-manufactured arms against 
American forces. And where military hardware went, military and diplomatic 
influence were sure to follow. Yet, the routing of Iraqi armies by American forces 
offered no evidence of the purported superiority of Russian weapons. That may 
have cooled a potentially hot market. One of the prospects for reviving Russian 
influence in the Middle East was supposed to have been the United Arab 
Emirates, a major purchaser of Russian arms in the last few years. It was 
revealed last week, however, that the UAE currently is interested only in the 
modernization of Russian military ammunition used by the UAE army. (ITAR-
TASS, 1654 GMT, 19 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0419, via World News 
Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
Where have all the Russians gone? 
Information from last year’s census, just released, indicates that the Russian 
population is continuing to decrease, due to a combination of emigration and low 
birth rates. Indeed, the first post-Soviet data collection puts the Russian 
population at seventh internationally, behind China, India, Indonesia, the United 
States, Brazil and Pakistan. (ITAR-TASS, 1049 GMT, 24 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-
2003-0424, via World News Connection) 
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The Russian State Statistics Committee announced that 145,290,000 individuals 
live in Russia currently, almost 2 million fewer than the population in 1989. This 
isn’t too startling: The committee had released preliminary numbers along those 
lines last autumn. However, at that time, Nationalities Policy Minister Vladimir 
Zorin had claimed that the figures indicated an increase in the population. 
"Despite all of the complications that the country is enduring, its permanent 
population is increasing," Zorin said, reporting that the largest increase was 
recorded in the central and southern federal districts, Moscow, Dagestan and 
Chechnya! (INTERFAX, 1234 GMT, 15 Nov 02; BBC Monitoring, via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
[Of course, the war in Chechnya makes some of the figures suspect, except, 
perhaps, to government officials. Vladimir Sokolin, the chairman of the State 
Statistics Committee, reassured radio listeners in January that, while actual 
figures were not compiled, "in 1989 there were already almost a million people in 
the Chechen Republic, something like 980 thousands or almost a million. And 
you will see that we regrettably do not have the most recent figures, but one can 
trust the visual impression: we have the highest birthrates -- in Chechnya and 
Dagestan and in a number of southern regions. It means that even with their rate 
of births, if we project it to the year 2002, and even considering that many 
Russians had left and so on, it means that their population should roughly be 
that. And the census has only confirmed this." (EKHO MOSKVY, 31 Jan 03; 
Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, via Lexis-Nexis)] 
 
To be sure, Zorin’s information on increases in Moscow and some southern 
regions was on the mark even if his final analysis was not. According to the State 
Statistics Committee, 7 million immigrants entered Russia, while 3 million 
emigrants left the country in the past 10 years. Approximately 27 million 
individuals moved residence within the country. Much of that relocation, it 
appears, was into cities and away from rural areas. More than 73 percent of the 
population now lives in cities, the census figures indicate, while nearly one-third 
of all villages are deserted. Indeed, 13 cities now have populations over one 
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million, although the trends are far from even: Figures indicate a 17 percent 
increase in Moscow’s population, while St. Petersburg experienced a drop of 6.4 
percent. (ITAR-TASS, 1049 GMT, 24 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0424, via World 
News Connection) Villages have not fared as well: Over 12,000 villages are 
completely deserted, while 22 percent of all rural villages contain settlements of 
fewer than 10 persons. Much of the decrease in population occurred in the 
northwest and central regions, while the southern regions (with large non-
Russian minorities) on the whole experienced an increase in residents. 
According to Sergei Kolesnikov, the deputy chairman of the Statistics Committee, 
the population has grown in Dagestan (by 43 percent), Kabardino-Balkaria (20 
percent), Stavropol territory (17 percent) and Krasnodar territory (11 percent). 
(ITAR-TASS, 1720 GMT, 23 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0423, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The low birth rate factor (1.2 percent less than what is needed to maintain 
population numbers) has caused some concern. Last year there were 1,396,800 
births and 2,331,400 deaths -- 85,200 more and 76,500 more, respectively, than 
in 2001. (ITAR-TASS, 21 Feb 03; via Lexis-Nexis) Not surprisingly, Russian 
academia held a roundtable recently to look into the problem. The prognosis is 
not good. Igor Mitkov, senior lecturer at Moscow State University’s Sociology 
Department, noted that by 2050 Russia's population will have lost between 40 
and 70 million persons. 
 
While various reasons for the decreasing birth rate were identified — including 
the economy — roundtable participants eventually agreed on one root cause: the 
increasingly vilified mass media, which, participants charged, have 
propagandized family planning, foisted alien ideals on the people, and advertised 
nontraditional methods of birth control. One of the main measures to surmount 
the demographic crisis proposed was to bring the mass media under state 
control and to keep an eye on their moral tone. Other proposals also were 
discussed -- ranging from the elaboration of a special state demographic 
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program to the creation of an expert consultative body under the State Duma, the 
introduction of lessons in the Orthodox religion in schools, and restoration of the 
prestige of large families. (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 3 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0403, 
via World News Connection) 
 
Life expectancy is another factor, of course — the birth rate is insufficient to 
make up for population loss. The average life expectancy for men is 58.5 years 
(below the level during the Soviet period), while women on average live 72 years. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1049 GMT, 24 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0424, via World News 
Connection) The crime rate contributes to those numbers, according to State 
Duma Security Committee Chairman Alexander Gurov. Gurov reports that crime 
causes over 150,000 deaths each year in Russia, while another 50,000 become 
victims of fires, suicide, alcoholism and drug abuse. (ITAR-TASS, 1159 GMT, 22 
Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0422, via World News Connection) 
 
REGIONS 
What if you held an election and nobody ran? 
The Norilsk city election commission had to postpone the scheduled mayoral 
election until 19 October, due to a lack of candidates. That lack was not the result 
of apathy, however, but rather was due to an unsupportive electoral atmosphere. 
 
The election is necessary to fill the opening created when former Mayor Oleg 
Budargin became the governor of Taimyr in January. Four individuals had been 
in the running — the trade union leader of Norilsk Nickel, Valery Melnikov; the 
head of the Norilsk City Council, Sergei Shmakov; a department director of 
Nornickel, Leonid Fraiman; and a lawyer from Krasnoyarsk, Alexander Gliskov. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1049 GMT, 30 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0430, via World News 
Connection) However, all four candidates dropped out of the race days before 
the polling was scheduled to take place. Melnikov had been the front runner after 
the first round on 20 April, but the next week the Norilsk court cancelled his 
registration at the request of the prosecutor's office, which accused him of 
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financial abuses and failing to observe the rules of canvassing on TV. Shmakov, 
who had placed second in the first round, subsequently decided to withdraw, 
saying he did not want to participate in the runoff alone. Then Fraiman, who had 
placed third, announced his withdrawal from the race. While the election 
committee was willing to give the voters a choice between Gliskov and no one, 
Gliskov was not. He withdrew his candidacy as well, saying he did not want to 
take part in voting without any other candidates. (Interfax, 1146 GMT, 29 Apr 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0429, via World News Connection) Perhaps, having obtained a 
tiny percent of the vote in the first round, he feared a repeat of Nizhny 
Novgorod’s city elections last autumn, in which roughly one-third of voters opted 
for "none of the above." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 20 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0920, via World News Connection) The candidates are eligible to run in the 
October elections. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Steve Kwast and Dan Rozelle 
 
Despite large investments, Russian aerospace is far behind the West 
Russia is falling behind Western military powers in every major measurement of 
aerospace power, despite massive investments in research and development 
efforts. What is Russia getting for its investment dollar and can it recover in time 
to protect its national security in the future? 
 
The latest news on this front comes from the Russian defense ministry. "Russia’s 
search for new forms and methods of fighting in air and space is being hampered 
by economic and technological problems. The fact that Russia is significantly 
lagging behind industrially developed countries economically has led to a 
progressing gap in equipping the national armed forces. This is especially clear 
in matters of high-tech and costly arms. The provision of the Russian Air Force 
with modern aviation and radar equipment does not exceed 50 percent. This is 
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unfortunate. We cannot achieve significant dominance in any strategic direction," 
a source in the ministry said. While war priorities have shifted towards air and 
space, Russia remains at World War II levels. (INTERFAX, 0942 GMT, 17 Apr 
03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0417, via World News Connection) 
 
Military members also have voiced concern. "The decline of Russia’s Air Force 
cannot be made up for [with] supplies of new aircraft in 2003. The pace of 
adoption of new hardware is not very high, and the share of aircraft that have 
been operating for more than 15 years constantly grows," officers from the Air 
Force Main Staff said. They point to the sharp reduction of budget appropriations 
for the modernization of the Air Force as the main reason and warn that, by 
2010, over one-third of the current aircraft will have reached the end of useful 
service life. (ITAR-TASS, 1553 GMT, 14 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0414, via 
World New Connection) 
 
The problem goes far beyond just hardware. The flight hours and training that are 
required to employ the aerospace equipment properly are suffering too. A 
spokesman for the chief of staff of the Russian Air Force said, "the Russian 
military has not met the training flight’s targets this year because of a shortage of 
fuel and spare parts. Solving these problems will require a radical revision of the 
combat training of the Air Force, which directly depends on the state of our 
economy." According to the Air Force command, the average pilot of a combat 
squadron is getting only 68 percent of the total required hours. (FINANCIAL 
TIMES, 17 Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
So what is happening to all the research and development money that Russia is 
pouring into aerospace? It is no secret that Moscow invests a great deal in that 
sector. Even though R&D programs can take decades to bear fruit, it is usual to 
see some trickle of technology change the way the military trains and fights. This 
has not been the case in Russia. The only significant military benefit that has 
emerged in the last few years from the R&D sector is the very capable air-to-air 
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guided missile designated the AA-12. (AVIATSKIYA KOSMONAVTIKA, 16 Apr 
03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Russian military training also has not changed in decades, as was evident at the 
latest demonstration of military capability to foreign military attaches in Lipetsk. 
Commander of the fourth training center of the Russian Air Force, Alexander 
Kharchevsky, noted many aerospace training tactics that have not altered since 
the 1960s. (IZVESTIA, 16 Apr 03; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) Such sparse product and training results over such a long 
period of time means that either there are much greater technological 
breakthroughs to come, or that the R&D money has not been efficiently utilized to 
maximize effective combat capability output. 
 
No answer may be possible without analyzing classified documents; the truth 
may be a little of both. The only major visible future capability in the aerospace 
industry is the creation of Russia’s fifth-generation combat plane, scheduled for 
completion in 2014. (ITAR-TASS, 0859 GMT, 16 Apr 03; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) It could be that Russia has fallen into one of the 
most common mistakes of military thinkers (i.e., when generals and politicians 
trust the predictions of scientists and engineers and invest in futuristic military 
ideas that turn out to be less than promised and years behind schedule). 
 
Regardless of what root causes might be found in any secret documents, the fact 
remains that Russia has failed to keep its military armed and ready to meet the 
current challenges of national security in the aerospace arena. Such failure falls 
directly on the shoulders of the military officers whose charge it is to ensure the 
development of such capability. Only the future will show how much military 
capability the Russian people will get out of their research and development 
rubles. Russian generals need to reflect on the historical wreckage of nations 
that failed to keep pace with the enemy. Today’s real enemy is terrorism and 
Russia is ill equipped to cope. 
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Russia renews efforts to hinder NATO expansion 
The war in Iraq has exposed a number of rifts within Europe and NATO on which 
Russia surely plans to capitalize as a means to obstruct NATO expansion. 
Regardless of the public reassurances to the contrary, there should be no doubt 
that Russia would like to halt the impending presence of NATO on its borders. 
(THE MOSCOW TIMES, 18 Nov 02; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Since its creation, NATO's primary military focus has been Russia and the now 
defunct Soviet Union. Today those concerns have been tempered. NATO and 
Russia now cooperate on issues of mutual interest in the newly established 
Russia-NATO Council. This forum has provided a venue for Russia to voice its 
concerns and to be included in the consideration of NATO security issues. The 
inclusion also has provided Russia some of the recognition and status it has 
sought within Europe. However, the most recent statements from its leadership 
make clear that Russia remains deeply suspicious of NATO and is strongly 
opposed to any expansion of the alliance. While this opposition will not prevent 
the seven invited countries from joining NATO, it appears that Moscow intends to 
have a say in the process. 
 
Over the course of the debate on NATO enlargement, Russia's opposition has 
coalesced around four issues: the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE), the Kaliningrad enclave, the status of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states 
and the lack of access to the changing security structures within Europe. 
 
The most vocal protests so far have come from the Russian military. According to 
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, former director of the defense ministry's main 
department of international cooperation, "NATO is an anachronism which has 
become obsolete. For Russia, however, NATO is a strong element of military 
threat. Russia's national security conceptual plan, the foreign policy conceptual 
plan and military doctrine all had that fact established. Unfortunately, Russia's 
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current political leaders have merely neglected this threat." (KOMMERSANT, 21 
Nov 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Securities Database) More 
recently, in a speech at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, General 
Mahmut Garaeev stated, "Today we are much more reserved in our attitude 
toward the NATO. But we need to tell the world once and for all that the 
enlargement of this bloc is unjustified in terms of its very existence since the end 
of the Warsaw Pact." (LAUKU AVIZE, 22 Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Driven perhaps by concern over their country’s flagging military strength, 
Russia's leaders have demanded NATO compliance with the CFE treaty. 
Negotiated to impose ceilings on the deployment of conventional arms, including 
tanks, armored vehicles, warplanes and artillery, the CFE was originally signed 
by the Soviet Union. In 1999 the treaty was revised to reflect the current geo-
political face of Europe after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Today the 
Russians want the Baltic states to accede to the treaty before officially joining 
NATO. Linking the CFE to NATO expansion would delay any enlargement, since 
no country can accede to the treaty until all signatories have ratified the revised 
agreement. (REUTERS, 20 Sep 02; via www.expandNATO.org) Moreover, 
Russia’s continued military presence in the South Caucasus itself constitutes a 
violation of the CFE amended clauses. Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee of RAND has 
told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Russia also may try to use 
CFE to constrain the ability of NATO -- and especially the US -- to carry out an 
Article 5 commitment to the Baltic states by limiting the alliance’s ability to station 
forces temporarily on the territory of the Baltic states. (FEDERAL NEWS 
SERVICE, 3 Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
Kaliningrad, home to Russia’s Baltic Fleet, also provides Moscow a means to 
challenge NATO enlargement. Claiming that NATO expansion would allow NATO 
weapons and aircraft to reach Russia in a matter of minutes, Russia has been 
threatening the deployment of nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad. There are also 
calls to upgrade the combat units stationed at Kaliningrad in response to NATO’s 
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growth. The insinuation, of course, is that none of this will occur if NATO 
expansion is halted or NATO agrees not to place forces in the territory of the new 
members. (Kaliningradskaya Pravda, 20 Mar 03; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Defense and Security Database) 
 
Not content to confine its opposition to expansion to military issues, Russia has 
resurrected its old accusation that the Baltic states discriminate against their 
Russian-speaking minorities. The implication here is that the Baltic states 
purportedly violate human rights and that NATO should avoid admitting them 
before more progress is made on ensuring minority rights. Russia’s Deputy 
Duma Speaker Lyubov Sliska even made note of the issue at a meeting between 
NATO representatives and the Duma. NATO, she believes, should be 
responsible for stopping the alleged human rights violations in Latvia and Estonia 
toward the Russian-speaking minority. (ROSBUSINESSCONSULTING 
DATABASE, 10 Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) Russia’s argument in this case is weak 
since the laws of those countries have been certified as conforming to European 
norms after exhaustive examinations by several international organizations. 
 
Sliska also expressed concerned about the "optimal structure of European 
security" during discussions on the war in Iraq. While Iraq may be the current 
sore point, her remarks were aimed toward the larger issue of Russia's 
participation in all of Europe's security affairs. (IZVESTIA, 11 Apr 03; What the 
Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) Russia's leadership seeks 
to prevent the central security role in Europe being played by a structure (NATO) 
to which Russia does not and will not have direct access. A Duma statement 
warned that "[enlargement] will considerably change the situation in the provision 
of security in Europe. [It] will not solve many problems European countries are 
facing, among them the threat of international terrorism, and will not contribute to 
the security of the alliance, and countries, which have expressed their wish to 
become members of the alliance." (ITAR-TASS, 24 Dec 02; via Lexis-Nexis) 
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Obviously Russia's leadership knows that it cannot compete with NATO as a 
guarantor of security within Europe. However, the conflict within Europe over Iraq 
has given Russia a new role that it clearly hopes to parlay into a stronger position 
of influence over affairs than it previously had enjoyed. Or, as Russian 
philosopher Aleksandr Dugin simply puts it, "The goal for Moscow is to tear 
Europe away from the control of the United States (NATO)." (LAUKU AVIZE, 22 
Apr 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Nadezda Kinsky 
 
UKRAINE 
New laws, new freedoms? 
On 28 April, President Leonid Kuchma signed a new law on "Society, Mass 
Media, Authorities: Freedom of Expression and Censorship in Ukraine." 
(INTERFAX, 27 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0427, via World News Connection) The 
bill had been passed by the Verkhovna Rada early in April. It defines media 
censorship, makes it illegal for officials to intervene in journalistic work and 
establishes limits for defamation cases. As if to underline the new law, Kuchma 
announced that he wanted to stop the defamation cases launched on his behalf 
against regional media. He claimed that he did not have anything to do with 
opening the cases and did not even know the media organs involved. 
 
Ukraine’s media landscape has not enjoyed a good reputation, and has been 
under particularly harsh international scrutiny since the Gongadze case. Once 
again, the situation is being described as deteriorating. The Rada's Human 
Rights ombudsperson, Nina Karpacheva, recently noted in her annual report that 
media freedom continues to be in danger. The Helsinki Commission drew special 
attention to this report and agreed with its disconcerting contents. With 36 
journalists killed in the last 10 years and many others suffering from acts of 
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intimidation, journalism continues to be ranked one of the most dangerous 
professions in Ukraine. The Human Rights Watch Report 2003 also noted subtle 
forms of media censorship that occur in Ukraine, through close ties between 
media moguls and government officials as well as presidential directives sent to 
the media -- particularly television outlets — containing instructions on which 
subjects are to be covered and how much air time is to be devoted to them. 
Although these "temniki" theoretically are mere memoranda, media that have not 
complied with these guidelines tend to find themselves facing tax audits, libel 
suits and/or license revocations. 
 
Similar criticisms emerged from the report issued at the beginning of April by the 
International Federation of Journalists in cooperation with the National Union of 
Journalists in Great Britain and Ireland after a research visit in Ukraine. 
(www.ifj.org) Three Human Rights and Media Watch reports published in the first 
quarter of the year noted serious deterioration in the standards in Ukraine. The 
Annual Freedom House Reports rate countries worldwide along a scale of 0-10 
indicating whether media can be considered free, partly free or not free. In the 
2003 Report, Ukraine dropped from "partly free" to "not free," due to "state 
censorship of television broadcasts, continued harassment and disruption of 
independent media, and the failure of authorities to adequately investigate 
attacks against journalists." (WWW.FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG) 
 
The new law has reaped some praise; perhaps it will increase respect for and 
freedom of the media. Article 19 has evaluated the law in a largely positive light, 
noting that it could constitute a first positive step toward providing the press 
freedoms that are theoretically assured in Ukraine by the Constitution and 1992 
Law on Information. Welcoming an increased transparency in information on 
state activities and institutions as well as the reduction of censorship, the 
organization nevertheless suggested amendments to ensure the success of such 
measures. Certainly there are holes as to the definition of censorship, the precise 
degree of freedom from state interference awarded to journalists and the 
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boundaries of potential defamation claims. However, probably the biggest issue 
at this point is the question of how successfully this law will be implemented. 
 
BELARUS 
Unpopular president 
Human rights reports about Belarus also are continuing to criticize the 
administration on topics ranging from media freedom to the disappearance of 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s political opponents. While criticism and concern remain 
at a high level, recent polls also have highlighted once more the undemocratic 
standards of the political system. International attention is focusing on the poor 
standard of political freedom, with repeated warnings to the leadership in Minsk 
that accusations of state-sponsored threats and disappearances of opposition 
leaders and journalists in the country should be investigated. The recent damning 
Human Rights report published at the end of March by the US State Department 
(WWW.STATE.GOV) centered on this issue, as did the Freedom House report: 
"The authoritarian regime of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka is openly hostile 
to a free press." (WWW.FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG/) 
 
Added to these long-standing concerns over media restriction and lack of 
democratic standards, non-governmental organizations in Belarus have 
denounced the justice ministry's policy towards NGOs, several of which recently 
have been threatened with closure. In a 29 April statement, the Assembly of 
Democratic non-governmental organizations called these policies "political 
cleansing" ahead of the parliamentary elections. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 30 Apr 
03) 
 
The Independent Institute for Socioeconomic and Political Studies in Belarus 
conducted a survey in March and April on President Lukashenka's standing, 
which revealed the extent of the president's unpopularity among the population. 
Only just over a quarter of the persons surveyed (26.2%) said that they would 
vote for the president and an even smaller portion (23.2%) said they would 
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reelect him based on the quality of his leadership. Far more than half the 
respondents would like to see someone else lead the country; most also would 
oppose legislation that would allow the president to run for a third term. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 22 Apr 03) The presidential elections in 2001, which extended 
Lukashenka's time in office to a second term, were deemed neither free nor fair 
by international election observers and have caused repeated ruptures with the 
West. A potential referendum is being planned in Belarus ahead of the next 
presidential election run-up to decide whether the constitution should be 
amended in order to allow President Lukashenka to extend his rule into a third 
term. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Case closed on September bombings 
May is to Moscow what August is to Washington -- the slowest time of the year. 
The month begins with May Day, the celebration of socialist labor, which is 
followed by the commemoration of Russia's victory in World War II on 9 May. In 
effect, the whole city goes on holiday from Thursday, 1 May, until Monday, 12 
May. 
 
On the eve of the holidays, the general prosecutor's office announced that it was 
closing the file on the September 1999 bombings in Moscow and Volgadonsk 
that set off the current war in Chechnya. According to the procuracy, there were 
nine terrorists: Emir Al-Khattab (killed in Chechnya); Abu Umar (by official 
accounts, killed in Chechnya, but some sources say he may never have existed 
at all); Achmez Gochiyaev (still at large); Khakim Abaev (still at large); Denis 
Saitakov (killed in Georgia); Zaur Batchaev (killed in Chechnya); Timur Batchaev 
(killed in Georgia); Yusuf Krymshamkhalov (in prison); and Adam Dekkushev (in 
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prison). Khattab and Abu Umar were Arabs; the other seven are members of 
North Caucasian nationalities. None of the terrorists was Chechen. 
(www.regions.ru, 30 Apr 03, and ROSBUSINESS CONSULTING, 30 Apr 03; via 
top.rbc.ru) 
 
Krymshamkhalov and Dekkushev were extradited from Georgia in December 
2002 and presently are being held in Moscow. They have not been indicted 
formally and it is not clear when a trial might begin. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1 
May 03) Interestingly, the four-month detention has not led authorities to new 
directions of inquiry, much less arrests. 
 
Yushenkov threatened by KGB 
On 22 April, news.ru reported that Sergei Yushenkov, the Duma deputy who was 
murdered on 17 April, had been threatened by retired KGB Major General 
Aleksandr Mikhailov. According to Yushenkov's assistant, Grigory Pasko, during 
a televised appearance Mikhailov had said "Yushenkov, we'll deal with you later." 
(WWW.NEWSRU.COM, 22 Apr 03) 
 
Yushenkov was the co-director with Sergei Kovalev of the public commission 
investigating the bombings in Moscow and Volgadonsk and the "training" in 
Ryazan. The commission’s efforts were focused on obtaining official documents 
pertaining to that "training." 
 
On 23 September 1999, Ryazan residents discovered a bomb in their basement 
and alerted the police. After the MVD arrested two suspects, who were FSB 
agents, the Moscow headquarters announced that the event in Ryazan was an 
exercise for local officers. Kovalev's and Yushenkov's commission was suing the 
government to procure the official documents (orders, plans, other paperwork) 
pertaining to this training. Yushenkov's murder dealt a serious setback to these 
efforts. 
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Boris Berezovsky, the oligarch-in-exile, produced a letter that Yushenkov wrote 
to British authorities on behalf of former Education Minister Nikita Chekulin on 25 
April 2002. Chekulin had publicized documents proving that a research institute 
under his ministry was shipping the explosive hexogen around Russia. In his 
letter Yushenkov said, "I studied the evidence produced by Mr. Chekulin and 
came to the conclusion that he is a highly reliable witness to an illegal operation, 
that is, the massive shipments of military explosives from military bases … 
throughout Russia. It is obvious to me that the perpetrators of this sort of crime 
must be connected to the federal security services." Yushenkov's letter went on 
to assert that those who are involved in this case take a grave risk, including the 
possibility of being murdered by "persons connected to Russian security 
services." (The text of the letter was published on www.newsru.com on 22 April 
2003) 
 
Politkovskaya's exclusive 
If the murder of a Duma deputy and the end of the road for the investigation into 
the bombings were not enough scandal for one month, the final touch came on 
28 April with the publication of a sensational report in Novaya gazeta. According 
to the paper, the GRU had an agent in Movsar Baraev's gang when it took 
hostages in Moscow last October. 
 
Anna Politkovskaya published an interview with Khanpash Nurdevich Terkibaev, 
who carries press credentials for a government newspaper for cover but does not 
claim to be a journalist. Terkibaev has had an outstanding career: He participated 
in the raid on Budennovsk, then served as press spokesman for Aslan 
Maskhadov and even had a television show "The President's Heart" (later 
renamed "The President's Path"). 
 
A participant in the Nord-Ost hostage-taking, Terkibaev claims to have become a 
peace mediator since then. "It was I who organized talks between Chechen 
parliamentarians and the administration, with [Sergei] Yastrzembsky." "I see 
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Yastrzembsky when I need to, I work for him," Terkibaev said, and he produced a 
photograph of the two men together that was authenticated by Novaya gazeta 
experts. (Terkibaev also produced a forgery of himself posing with Maskhadov 
and Margaret Thatcher.) 
 
This is only the beginning. "Since Nord-Ost I visited Surkov twice," he asserted. 
Vladislav Surkov is the deputy head of the presidential administration and is 
considered immensely influential. Terkibaev claimed to have had lunch recently 
in Dubai with Maskhadov's wife Kusama and son, Anzor. "Akhmed Zakaev and I 
are friends, we worked together in the theater," he said later in the interview, 
referring to Maskhadov's representative in Europe. Under Dmitri Rogozin's 
direction, Terkibaev took a group of Chechen deputies to Strasbourg. In short, in 
the space of one interview Terkibaev managed to mention every influential 
politician connected in one way or another to Chechnya. 
 
The portion pertaining directly to Nord Ost follows: 
"Your name was published among the list of terrorists in Nord-Ost. Did you sue 
that publication?" asks Politkovskaya. 
"I asked Yastrzembsky ‘how could that happen?’," says Terkibaev. 
"How did he respond?," asks Politkovskaya. 
"He told me not to worry about it," says Terkibaev. 
"Did you know the younger Baraev for a long time?" asks Politkovskaya. 
"Yes. I know everyone in Chechnya," responds Terkibaev. 
 
He admitted to entering Dubrovka with the terrorists and leaving shortly before 
the security services stormed the theater. Then the interview ended, and 
Politkovskaya included a series of sensational assertions that are not bolstered 
by direct quotes from her source. Politkovskaya stated that Terkibaev had 
persuaded Baraev and the others to stage the raid on Nord Ost by telling them 
that negotiations had been assured. The Russians had been bribed, she said, 
and if the Chechens "made some noise," negotiations would begin. 
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Politkovskaya also said that it was Terkibaev who provided safe passage for the 
Chechen unit in Moscow. Then she concluded that Terkibaev must have been 
working for military intelligence, GRU. 
 
Clearly there are many oddities in this article, not the least of which is the fact 
that a person listed officially as a terrorist was posing for photos with 
Yastrzembsky. Terkibaev's willingness to volunteer so much information to 
Novaya gazeta is also rather odd. Terkibaev's vanity and arrogance are very 
much on display, as is his limited intelligence. Perhaps he does not sense the 
danger that this interview poses, or perhaps he is being used — this time to 
deflect attention from the more serious stories discussed above. 
 
Shermatova's exclusive 
Sanobar Shermatova and Aleksandr Teit published a detailed portrait of the 
female suicide bombers in Movsar Baraev's unit in the 30 April issue of 
Moskovskie novosti. The portraits of six terrorists are based on extensive 
interviews with their families and represent the first serious effort to describe their 
motivations. Interestingly, three of the women were recently married and 
expecting children. Their husbands also took part in the raid. The three others 
seem to have been motivated by grief over the loss of many family members. All 
six had some degree of involvement with Wahhabis. 
 
Another important insight contained in the article is that Abubakar, a masked 
gunman accompanying Movsar Baraev, may have been the one in charge. In 
televised footage Abubakar is seen speaking to Baraev in Chechen while Baraev 
was speaking to the press. The import of these Chechen phrases is to suggest to 
Baraev, "don't say too much" or "say Maskhadov" (when Baraev was saying that 
Basaev had sent him on the operation). According to the authors, the interaction 
suggests strongly that Abubakar was the leader and Movsar provided a famous 
last name. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Economic and security concerns 
Rather than giving legitimacy to the Uzbek government, the recent European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) meetings in Tashkent 
highlighted the region’s economic challenges. With the exception of the energy 
sector, Central Asia is an economically difficult sell to Western investors. At the 
level of security and as members of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), the signatories of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) are developing a 
rapid reaction force to address security concerns. 
 
Economic Concerns — EBRD meetings in Tashkent 
On 4-5 May, the EBRD held its annual meetings in Tashkent, despite frustrations 
with Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s failure to implement promised financial 
reforms. The EBRD, which aims to stimulate the private sector of formerly 
communist countries, has been forced to distance itself from any message that 
would suggest that the meeting location is an endorsement of Uzbek economic 
policies. On the contrary, a Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal ranking 
of the economic freedoms of 156 countries placed Uzbekistan 149th (below 
Burma), while Freedom House gave Uzbekistan a rating slightly better than Iraq 
and Turkmenistan with regard to political freedoms and civil rights. The EBRD 
has been criticized on a number of fronts for its selection of Uzbekistan as the 
site of its first large meeting in Central Asia. Optimists, however, hope that the 
meeting will serve as an opportunity to push for reform of international economic 
practices throughout the region. (INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, 29 Apr 03; 
via www.crisisweb.org, and Eurasianet, 2 May 03; via www.eurasianet.org) 
 
Such reforms, however, are unlikely to come out of the EBRD meetings. In 
Kazakhstan, for example, where corruption and rights violations are common, 
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Moody’s Investor Services gave the country a higher investment rating than it 
gave some American cities. (EURASIANET, 28 Apr 03; via www.eurasianet.org) 
With regards to the energy sector, the message sent is that democratic principles 
(which the EBRD tries to foster) are not requisite factors for economic 
investment. And while countries attempt to improve their image through promises 
to international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) — 
e.g., Uzbekistan’s planned meetings with IMF representatives at the EBRD 
meeting (INTERFAX, 1356 GMT, 24 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0424, via World 
News Connection) — they often are slow to follow through on promised reforms. 
 
Developing the rapid reaction forces 
The CIS rapid reaction forces serve as a statement of CST self-reliance. As a 
small group of around 160 Kyrgyz protested in Bishkek to demand the withdrawal 
of the US Air Force from its base at Manas airport, (INTERFAX, 0711 GMT, 1 
May 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0501, via World News Connection) Kazakhstan’s 
General Staff and Deputy Defense Minister Malik Saparov lauded the 
development of the (mainly Russian) rapid reaction force’s air base in Kant, 
Kyrgyzstan, roughly equidistant between Bishkek and the Kazakh border. The 
Kant air base is scheduled to have around 20 Russian and Kyrgyz aircraft, 
(ITAR-TASS, 0233 GMT, 30 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0430, via World News 
Connection) and the base — which under the CST is intended to bolster Central 
Asia’s regional security — will be maintained by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. According to Saparov, "The deployment of a Russian air group 
will shield our collective security and the security of our state from possible 
external threats and complies with Kazakhstan’s defense policy and military 
doctrine." (INTERFAX, 1449 GMT, 29 Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0429, via World 
News Connection) 
 
At a recent meeting of the Collective Security Council (CSC) in Tajikistan, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin, as the outgoing council chairman, transferred 
his chairmanship to Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov. Rakhmonov will head 
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the CSC for a year, until the council’s 2004 meeting. (INTERFAX, 0746 GMT, 28 
Apr 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0428, via World News Connection) The CSC functions 
under the CST and the meeting in Tajikistan was seen as a foundational step 
towards increasing the roles and responsibilities of the CST into a more broad-
based international regional organization. (ITAR-TASS, 2053 GMT, 27 Apr 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0428, via World News Connection) While certain aspects of the 
economy look to the West and seek the resources of the IMF, EBRD, and foreign 
investors, the countries of the CST are moving forward to secure regional 
stability through Russian military hegemonic influence over the CIS. 
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